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Interest of the Amicus Curiae1
The amicus is comprised of five individuals who
are an interdisciplinary team that is researching
programmer creativity (“Research Team”). Each
member is a professor with the expertise described
below:
•

Ralph D. Clifford, the principal
investigator, is a professor of law at the
University of Massachusetts School of
Law who specializes in intellectual
property
and
cyberlaw
issues,
specifically including the requisite
creativity needed for copyright. See
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property

in the Era of the Creative Computer
Program: Will the True Creator Please
Stand Up?, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1675 (1997);
Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers,
Chaos Theory and Cogitation: A Search
for the Minimal Creativity Standard in
Copyright Law, 82 Denver L. Rev. 259
(2004) [hereinafter Clifford, Random
Numbers]; Ralph D. Clifford, Creativity
Revisited, 59 IDEA 25 (2018). Before
obtaining his law degree, he studied
computer science at the undergraduate
This brief was written exclusively by the amicus’s
counsel with the exclusive generous financial support of the
University of Massachusetts—Dartmouth. No counsel for a
party authored any portion of this brief. The institutional
affiliation of the individuals comprising the Amicus are for
identification only and do not represent the position of their
institutions.
This brief is submitted with the blanket consent of
Google LLC and the written consent of Oracle America, Inc.
1
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level
and
programming
years.
•

practiced
computer
professionally for ten

Firas Khatib is an Assistant Professor of
Computer and Information Science at
the University of Massachusetts—
Dartmouth
who
specializes
in
bioinformatics and citizen science. See
Firas Khatib et al., Players, Algorithm

Discovery by Protein Folding Game
Players, Proc. of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci.

U.S.A. (2011), https://doi.org /10.1073/
pnas.1115898108.
•

Trina Kershaw is an Associate Professor
of Psychology at the University of
Massachusetts—Dartmouth
who
specializes in cognitive processes, the
creative
process,
and
creativity
measurement in laboratory settings and
in engineering design. See Trina
Kershaw et al., A Decision Tree Based

Methodology for Evaluating Creativity
in Engineering Design, Frontiers in
Psychology
(2019),
https://doi.org/
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00032.
•

Kavitha Chandra is the Associate Dean
and Professor of Electrical and
Computer Engineering at the Francis
College of Engineering, University of
Massachusetts—Lowell who specializes
in
computational
acoustics
and
creativity in engineering.
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•

Jay McCarthy is an Associate Professor
of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts—Lowell who specializes
in the analysis of computer programs
and programming languages, especially
for the purposes of verifying the
correctness and equivalence of different
programs that attempt to do the same
thing.
See
Jay
McCarthy,
A
Programmable Programming Language,
Comm. of the ACM (Mar. 2018); Jay
McCarthy, Model Checking Task
Parallel Programs for Data-Race, NASA
Formal Methods Symp. (2018); Jay
McCarthy,
Cryptographic
Protocol
Explication and End-Point Projection,
European Symp. on Research in Comp.
Sec. (2018).
Summary of Argument

This brief answers the two primary issues that
are associated with the first question before the
Court. First, the programmers’ expression of the
Java-based application programmer interfaces
(“APIs”) are sufficiently creative to satisfy that
requirement of copyright law. Second, the ideaexpression limitation codified in Section 102(b) of
Copyright Act does not establish that the APIs are
ideas. Both of these assertions are supported by the
empirical research undertaken by the Research
Team.
This brief expresses no opinion on the
resolution of the fair use question that is also before
the Court.
3

I.

Creativity

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991), teaches that all works must be
the result of creative expression in order to qualify for
a copyright. However, as Feist specifically addressed
the white pages of the classic telephone book, id. at
342, little guidance is provided for dealing with more
expressive works such as computer programs.
Further, language in Feist instructs that copyrighted
works should be based on “creative spark.” Id. at 345.
Unfortunately, this direction does little to explain
how the “spark” is to be identified, a problem that is
compounded by the dual expressive-functional
characteristics of a computer program.
As a practical matter, without turning Feist’s
creativity requirement into a subjective analysis of
how the particular author functioned during the
work’s creation, or allowing it to become an excuse for
the judicial censorship much feared by this Court
more than a hundred years ago in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52
(1903).2 an objective measurement is needed.
Consequently, “creativity” should be found where it is
apparent that the author had many different ways a
particular idea could have been expressed, from
which the author made an intellectually-based
selection. See Clifford, Random Numbers at 295–96.

“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. ... At the other end, copyright would be
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than
the judge.”
2

4

When this is applied to the APIs in question in
this litigation (“Oracle’s APIs”), it is clear that the
Feist creativity requirement is met. See Oracle Am.,
Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1354 & 1356–57
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (case below). As our research
demonstrates, even the simplest computer program is
capable of being expressed in many ways.3 As
programs become more complex, the number of
unique solutions also increases.4 Consequently, as
there are clearly choices for a programmer to make
from a wide variety of expressions, Feist creativity
exists for the vast majority of computer programs
including Oracle’s APIs.
II.

Idea/Expression Dichotomy

Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act codifies the
requirement that a copyright’s protection be limited
to the expression created by the author, expressly
excluding the ideas that underlie the creation.
Separating ideas from expressions has never been
easy; indeed, courts have long struggled with
establishing guidance on how to make this
distinction. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Picture
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
When applied to the technical writing that is
programming, drawing the distinction becomes more
3 The Research Team’s preliminary study involves
correctly functioning code submitted by multiple programmers
to solve the same problem. The simplest program in our research
set—searching for the most frequent character pattern within a
larger string—demonstrated a large variety of solutions: 20
unique solutions were created by the 27 programmers.

On the most complex program in the research set, 23
unique solutions were submitted by the 26 programmers who
solved the problem.
4
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difficult as those defining the line rarely have
sufficient technological background to inherently
understand what the programmer has written.
Despite the difficulty of analysis, there is a
developing accord among the circuit courts that the
analytical approach established for literary works in
Nichols is an appropriate approach for separating the
ideas and expressions within a computer program.
See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445–46 (9th
Cir. 1994). But see Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir.
1986). This analytic approach was adopted by the
Federal Circuit in the case at bar, see Oracle, 750 F.3d
at 1357 (applying 9th Circuit precedents), and should
now be established as the appropriate methodology
for all copyright cases, including those that involve
computer software.
Care and guidance is needed, however, for the
lower courts to properly apply the abstracting and
filtering process to computer programs. First, as
matters are abstracted, care is needed in
distinguishing between public domain ideas and
public domain expressions. Reusing a public domain
idea does not impact the expression’s copyrightability
as all are free to re-express the idea. See Bleistein,
188 U.S. at 249.5 Only if the author is attempting to
recapture a public domain expression should the
courts prevent the attempt. Second, artificial
distinctions should not be imposed on computer
“Others are free to copy the original. They are not free
to copy the copy.”
5
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programs because they are assertedly the result of
engineering-based rather than artistically-based
human inspiration. As our research demonstrates,
expressive creativity underlies both types of
inspiration at a level sufficient to satisfy Feist. The
conclusion that directly flows from this is that, as with
other literary works protected by copyrights,
computer programs are primarily expressive.
The secondary conclusion that flows from this
is the limited applicability of the merger doctrine in
evaluating computer software copyrights. Rather
than only having a limited number of expressions
available, the programmer has a large number from
which to choose.
Argument
I.

The Court Should Clarify the Definition of the
“Creativity” Needed Under Feist to Provide an
Objective Test Based on the Author Having
Had Available Multiple Variations of
Expression from Which an Intellectual Choice
Was Made

In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), this Court
established that there is a threshold of creativity that
must be contained within a compilation of facts in
order for a copyright to subsist. See id. at 348. The
Court stated:
[T]he work [must be] independently
created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and [must]
possess[] at least some minimal degree
of creativity. To be sure, the requisite
7

level of creativity is extremely low; even
a slight amount will suffice. The vast
majority of works make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative
spark, no matter how crude, humble or
obvious it might be. Originality does not
signify novelty; a work may be original
even though it closely resembles other
works so long as the similarity is
fortuitous, not the result of copying.

Id. at 345 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
While the Court’s Feist opinion suggests that
this creativity requirement is a requisite of all
copyrighted works, not just compilations, see id., the
Court’s discussion of creativity in the context of a
factual compilation provides clouded guidance as to
the nature of the requirement for more fanciful works
such as the computer programs in the case at bar. The
resulting contradictory holdings of the circuit courts
when addressing fanciful works bear witness to the
need for a clarifying ruling on the meaning of
copyright creativity. Compare, e.g., Satava v. Lowry,
323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003) (disallowing copyright in
an artistic glass jellyfish sculpture) with Boisson v.
Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing
copyright in much simpler quilt design). This same
confusion concerning the appropriate standard arises
in the evaluation of computer programs as stated by
the court below: “Circuit courts have struggled with,
and disagree over, the tests to be employed when
attempting to draw the line between what is
protectable expression and what is not.” Oracle, 750
F.3d at 1357. Consequently, this Court should clarify
8

the standard of creativity for works such as those at
bar that are more fanciful than the white pages from
a telephone book.
At its core, Feist seemed most concerned with
the choices that were available to and made by the
author. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. The Court stated,

Id.

The compilation author typically chooses
which facts to include, in what order to
place them, and how to arrange the
collected data so that they may be used
effectively by readers. These choices as
to selection and arrangement, so long as
they are made independently by the
compiler and entail a minimal degree of
creativity, are sufficiently original that
Congress may protect such compilations
through the copyright laws.

Producing computer programs and other more
fanciful works clearly exceeds the mere “choosing”
and “ordering” found in a factual compilation. To
clarify how the Feist holding applies to these more
fanciful works, the two prerequisites required of a
compilation should be restated and required of any
work, including Oracle’s APIs. Authors of fanciful
works do not choose and order facts; instead, they
choose how to express a concept from the multitude of
ways in which this can be done. This choice-making
can serve as the foundation for an objective creativity
test for non-compilation works. In other words, to be
copyrightable, all works must result from their
authors making choices from a multitude of possible
9

ways of expressing the work. See Clifford, Random
Numbers at 295–96.
Determining if this has occurred would be
practical as part of the fact-finding of the courts. To
determine if the minimum creativity required is
present, the court would need to examine the work to
determine that the author had choices and made a
decision to express the work in the way it was done.
Fundamentally, to determine if creativity exists
within a work, it must be established that the author
“ma[d]e a judgment, ... determine[d] a preference; [or]
c[a]me to a conclusion,” Decide, Random House
Unabridged Dictionary 517 (2d Ed. 1993), about the
expression used. Only where this decision making is
apparent can the courts be sure that the “modicum of
creativity” required by Feist, 499 U.S. at 362, exists
within the work.
When this type of test is applied to computer
software, our research shows that the typical program
complies. In our initial research protocol, 27 student
programmers were given four problems to solve that
required them to write software.6 Each submitted
program was tested and successfully solved the
assigned problem before it was included in the
research dataset.
Having built the dataset, the code generated
was analyzed based on the number of each
“fundamental
programming
construct”
the

The students were all in a course that addressed using
computer technology to solve processing problems associated
with DNA research.
6
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programmer had used to produce the code.7 By
determining all of the constructs used by each
programmer, expressive differences in the code was
captured based on the different choices of constructs
made by the programmers. As an example, one
programmer might have chosen to write part of the
code based on a “for” loop while another might have
chosen a “while” loop. Ultimately, as both programs
achieved a solution to the same problem, the choice of
which loop type to use becomes expressive as neither
has computational advantage over the other. By
accumulating all of these differences over all of the
different types of constructs, an overall program
description code could be created. If two programs had
the same description code assigned to it, they were
expressively the same;8 if the description code
differed, significantly different ways were used to
express the same programming function.
The first problem assigned to the programmers
was to determine the most frequent character pattern
of a certain size within a larger string. This problem
is not trivial to code but is also not computationally
complex. Most programmers would be able to
correctly code a solution within a few hours. When the
7 A “programming construct” is a particular instruction
that all programming languages provide. Our research identified
seven of these: subroutines, for loops, while loops, if statements,
else statements, case statements, and go to statements.

This excludes differences based on the variables and
other names chosen by the programmer. Our research also
captures these differences, but has discounted them here as a
change in variable name, standing alone, is the kind of trivial
variation that is given little credence in copyright law. Cf.
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (“A person’s name ... is not a work of authorship....”).
8
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programs solving this problem within our dataset
were analyzed, however, the number of unique
solutions submitted was significantly large. In fact,
there were 20 unique solutions among the 27
programs written to solve the problem, a percentage
of variation of 74.1%.
As would be expected, more complex problems
had a larger number of unique solutions. A later
assignment given to the programmers required that
they develop code that solves for what is known as a
“greedy motif search with pseudocounts” problem.9
Twenty-three unique solutions were submitted
among the 26 solutions submitted (one programmer
failed to submit a valid program), a percentage of
variation of 88.5%.
What this demonstrates is that there are a
multitude of programs that can be expressed to solve
even fairly trivial computer programming problems.
More directly, there are a large number of expressive
choices from which each programmer-author can

9 The goal of the “greedy motif search” algorithm is to
find similar motifs in long segments of DNA sequences. A “motif”
is a short string of DNA that denotes the location in the full DNA
string where a regulatory protein should attach in order for the
DNA to carry out its gene expression purpose.
The search algorithm is complicated because motifs from
similar DNA sequences contain minor variations and are
therefore not identical. This introduces the need for probability
determinations when comparing a potential motif to a DNA
string. As probabilities of zero would cause significant
processing problems, “pseudocounts” are used to mathematically
prevent zeros from occurring.

12

choose an expression of his or her desire.10 Feist’s
standard of creativity based on making choices among
expressions has been established.
Of course, in the case at bar, the degree of
complexity of the software in litigation far exceeds the
relatively uncomplicated programs in our research
dataset. Oracle’s APIs involve thousands of lines of
code to define the “overall system of organized
names—covering 37 packages, with over six hundred
classes, with over six thousand methods.” Oracle, 750
F.3d at 1351. In creating Oracle’s APIs, the
programmers created at least “thousands of
individual elements” resulting in “7,000 lines of
declaring code” as that was what Google copied. Id. at
1349 & 1353. Within these thousands of methods and
lines of code, numerous expressive decisions were
made. As a de minimus example, even the choice to
call the example function described by the court below
“MAX” rather than “MAXIMUM” or “LARGER,”
represents an expressive choice. See id. at 1349–50.
Consequently, the Court should find that
sufficient creativity exists in Oracle’s APIs to satisfy
the Feist creativity standard. This requires an
examination of the idea/expression dichotomy.

If the programmer’s choice of variable names is
included, every program becomes completely unique.
10
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II.

The
Court
Should
Interpret
the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b),
so that the Expressive Nature of Computer
Software Remains Protected by Copyright

Distinguishing between an idea and its
expression has never been easy. See Nichols v.
Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930) (L. Hand, J.). See also Holmes v. Hurst, 174
U.S. 82, 86 (1899). Despite the analytical difficulty
required, the fundamental approach established by
Judge Hand—abstracting the content of the work at
decreasing levels of detail and searching among these
abstractions for the point where allowing the
copyright would result in the copyright preempting
the underlying idea, see Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121—
provides a compelling and logical solution to the
problem of applying Section 102(b) presented by the
case at bar. Indeed, this abstraction and examination
approach has been widely adopted and is part of the
most widely accepted test among the Circuit Courts of
Appeal for copyright infringement of a computer
program, see, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Gates Rubber
Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th
Cir. 1993); Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532,
1543–46 (11th Cir. 1996); Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355–
56 (case below). This analytical approach has not been
universally adopted, however, as the Third Circuit
has endorsed a much more intuitive approach. See
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).

14

A.

The
Court
Should
Adopt
the
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test
to Separate Ideas from Expressions in a
Computer Program

Upon examination, the Computer Assocs.
approach—the
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
Test—is more meritorious than Whelan’s intuitive
approach.11 It is vital that courts scrutinize computer
programs that are claimed for copyright to enforce the
idea/expression dichotomy found in Section 102(b). As
with other fact-based works, the intertwining of
expressions and ideas within a computer program
require a critical examination and dissection of it.
This is made more crucial as computer software both
expresses and implements the programmer’s code.
Further, unlike English language works, computer
programs are not communicative to non-specialists,
limiting the power of an intuitive approach to reach a
valid conclusion.
Consequently, this Court should adopt the
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
Test
to
implement section 102(b). This approach, described in
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706–11, provides the
appropriate foundation for understanding the
dividing line between ideas and expressions in
computer programs. Unlike the Whelan approach,
this test requires a careful consideration of the
copyrighted software and insures that its author
Whelan is mostly criticized here for its approach and
its limits. The Whelan court quite accurately excluded the basic
business purpose of the software in the case under 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b), but failed to examine the code for other ideas that
should have also been excluded from the protections of copyright
law.
11

15

maintains rights to the expression while allowing all
others use of any contained ideas. Whelan does not do
this. Limiting the idea in computer software to what
the overall purpose of the program is designed to
achieve, see Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236, removes many
ideas (both of business processing and computer
programming) from use by improperly including
these within the copyright.
B.

Guidance is Needed from the Court on
What Matters are Properly Filtered out
of the Expression Within a Computer
Program
1.

Proper Filtering Recognizes the
Expressive Nature of Computer
Programs

Computer Assocs. was mostly on point about
the details of how to exclude ideas from coverage by
the copyright, expressed in the “filtering” part of the
court’s tripartite test. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d
at 707–10. When a particular expression is present
within software only because that expression is
needed in order for the software to operate on the
target hardware, Computer Assocs. was correct in
excluding that statement from consideration as part
of the expression. See id. at 709–10. Indeed, our
research indirectly confirms this as the machineoriented programming constructs were excluded from
our dataset as including them mis-characterized the
similarities within the different programmer’s code.
Similarly, the presence or absence of any given
fundamental programming construct in itself should
not be considered expression as these are required to
produce all computer programs written in procedural
languages. As the line moves from the individual
16

statement types to selected combinations of the
constructs, however, the copyright line between idea
and expression has been crossed and the realm of
expressions has been reached. As our research
demonstrates, even simple programming tasks can
result in a wide range of possible expressions,
negating an assertion that computer programs are
mostly ideas rather than the expression of them.
Instead, our research establishes that computer
programs are highly expressive with significant
variations existing in how even the simplest program
is written. Our research has established this in two
ways.
First, we examined the number of unique
versions of each program that were submitted.12
These calculations showed that almost 75% of the
simplest programs were different from all of the
others and almost 90% of the more complicated
programs varied. Based on this, we determined that
variation was the norm, not the exception.
Second, to confirm our preliminary findings,
the Research Team subjected the multiple versions of
the four programs to formal statistical analysis. By
examining the average number of times each
fundamental programming construct was used in
comparison to each’s standard deviation, the large
degree of variation was clear. Surprisingly, for three
of the constructs (subroutines, for loops, and else
statements), the standard deviation was actually
larger than the average. While the inherent meaning
of this is limited, it does suggest that the data points
The methodology used to make this determination is
set forth above. See supra pp. 10–13.
12
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are widely scattered and may exist without a defining
pattern. In other words, the programmers do not
choose to use the constructs based on any defined
underlying rule; rather, they are making
intellectually-based choices among the possible
expressions. To test this, we assumed the opposite
and performed an univariate ANOVA (analysis of
variance) based on the constructs each example
program used. An ANOVA procedure is a way to test
if there are significant mean group differences on a
variable of interest. See Sarah Boslaugh & Paul
Watters, Statistics in a Nutshell 232–38 (2008). For
example, an ANOVA can determine if the number of
“for” loops used by each programmer was compelled
by a factor such as the algorithm rather than
individual choice. In other words, a non-significant
ANOVA test would establish that there was no
expressive creativity used in the programming effort.
In fact, our analysis established a high degree
of variation among the choices made by the
programmers with F-test scores ranging from 11.97
through 39.51.13 Values this high on an F-test is
consistent with a large degree of variation in the code
and rejects the null hypothesis that there is an
underlying common justification for the choice of
which set of programming constructs to use. To
summarize the statistical analysis, it shows that the
choice of programming constructs by each
programmer are unconstrained by a common
variable. Consequently, programmers are making
creative expressive choices.
13 The

p-test score for these results were less than .0001,
far smaller than the minimum (.05) required for statistical
significance.
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Because of this kind of difference being found
within computer code, it is unlikely that the copyright
merger concept, see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp.
v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971), will
provide any help for evaluating computer software. As
a result, the district court’s reliance on the merger
doctrine to invalidate the Oracle copyright, see Oracle
Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 998
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (case below), was misplaced and the
Federal Circuit was correct to overrule the lower
court’s decision on this ground. Oracle, 750 F.3d at
1360. Our research has established that even for the
simplest code in the dataset (programs that are 25 to
50 lines in length), so many alternative methods of
expression existed that asserting that the idea and
expression have merged in any computer program—
except the most trivial—is unsustainable. When the
degree of coding variation found within computer code
is scaled up to software on the scope of Oracle’s APIs,
merger is impossible.
The fact that the copyrighted expression in
litigation is only the declaring code rather than the
operational or implementing code, see Oracle, 750
F.3d at 1349, does not change this analysis. While
there were obviously considerably more choices made
by the programmers who created the operable aspects
of Oracle’s APIs, more than enough creative choices
were made by them in creating the 7,000 lines of
declaring code, see id. at 1349 & 1353, to satisfy the
copyright requirements.
In summary, when Oracle’s APIs are
examined, it is clear that there were thousands of
different ways the APIs could have been written when
19

they were created. As a result, the Federal Circuit
was correct to determine that they are protected from
copying by the Copyright Act.
2.

Proper Filtering Does Not
Establish Improper Barriers to
Protecting
Programming
Expressions

Although our research established the viability
of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the
Computer Assocs. court made a significant mistake
when it attempted to address the overall efficiency of
a computer algorithm. According to the Second
Circuit, the more efficient a computer program is, the
more likely it is to be an idea rather than an
expression. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 707–
09 (treating efficiency as an idea as a matter of law).
This holding is based on a mistaken view of efficiency
both within computer programming and within the
broader engineering disciplines in which it resides
and is inconsistent with our research.
The Computer Assocs. court misunderstood
efficiency as it exists within an engineering discipline
such as computer science. Unlike the court’s view,
there is no single point of efficiency that programs
attempt to reach with success meaning that an idea
has been reached. Instead, all programming efforts
result in the programmer balancing a multitude of
considerations that are often contradictory.14 In
This same thing is true in all other engineering
disciplines. Recently, for example, the Tappan Zee bridge across
the Hudson River in New York was replaced. See Karen DeWitt,
Tappan Zee Bridge Set to Open, https://www.northcountry
publicradio.org/news/story/34544/20170824/tappan-zee-bridge14
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programming, for example, greater speed can often be
achieved, but only as an escalating cost. Even speed
of operation, itself, may not be the most important
criteria; indeed, in earlier programming efforts,
limiting the amount of storage space that was needed
by the program was typically far more critical than
achieving blinding processing speed.15 Furthermore,
when applied to something as complex as computer
software,
determining
efficiency
becomes
extraordinarily difficult as most times the evaluation
has to be reduced to probabilities as the data being
processed can radically affect the resulting speed. See
Donald E. Knuth, Fundamental Algorithms § 1.2.10
(2d ed. 1975). In summary, achieving some type of
efficiency within a computer program does not
transform it into an idea.
Similarly, the courts below have often failed to
carefully distinguish between public domain
expressions which should be filtered out of a work and
public domain ideas which should not. See, e.g.,
Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714–15; Satava, 323
set-to-open-questions-remain-on-future-tolls.
Determining
which of the two bridges is the more “efficient” one makes no real
sense. Does that analysis focus on cost? The number of cars that
can be carried? The size of the largest truck that can safely cross?
The bridge’s attractiveness? Clearly, “efficiency” is not a single
point.
This need for storage efficiency lead to a problem that
was known as the “Y2K” problem as programmers, for years, had
saved storage space by not storing the “19" that was associated
with the year; instead,1965 would be stored as 65, thus saving ½
of the needed space. See Josh Hodas, What are the main
15

problems with the Y2K computer crisis and how are people
trying
to
solve
them?,
Sci.
Am.,
June,
1999,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-are-the-mainproblem.
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F.3d at 810. As this Court best expressed it in
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249, “[o]thers are free to copy
the original. They are not free to copy the copy.” In the
case at bar, Google was free to re-express the idea of
APIs in general, including the functional
characteristics needed by application programmers.16
Google was not free merely to copy Oracle’s
expression.
Finally, as the Federal Circuit ruled below,
Google’s desire to achieve interoperability—or more
accurately, its goal to reduce the chance that its
programmers would be confused by a different API
system—is not relevant to whether Oracle’s APIs
were ideas. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1371.17 Ideas exist
independently of how another may wish to use it. By
analogy, many may wish to use the Hogwarts world
created by J.K. Rowling or the Middle-Earth world
created by J.R.R. Tolkien, but both are creative
expressions of their authors and, thus, are protectable
by copyright. Of course, neither author’s copyright
protects the idea of having a world of magic, so future
16 Indeed, the general concept of an API has existed by
that name since at least the early 2000s. See Mary Sweeney,
Visual Basic for Testers 211 (2001) (discussing the “APIs” used
in Microsoft Windows). Of course, the concept without the name
existed for decades before that. See Macro Assemblers,
Encyclopedia of Comp. Sci. 99–100 (Anthony Ralston et al. ed.
4th ed. 2000) (describing achieving standard programming tasks
by using the macro system available with 1960–1980-era IBM
computers);
IBM
Corp.,
OS/VS-VM/370
Assembler
Programmer’s Guide 69 (5th ed. 1982) (defining “library macro
definition” as “IBM-supplied ... macro definitions”).

As the Federal Circuit acknowledged, interoperability
may be relevant to a fair use analysis. See id. at 1369–70. This
brief takes no position on this question.
17
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authors can always express their own versions.
Similarly in the case at bar, Oracle was free to express
its own “world” of APIs. If Google wants one too, it is
free to create one. Google should not be free, however,
to appropriate what Oracle had already expressed.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court
should affirm the decision of the Federal Circuit that
the Respondent’s software APIs are protected by valid
copyrights. The APIs are creative expressions worthy
of copyright protection. Providing this protection will
not stop others, including Google, from developing its
own set of APIs.
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